In a hospital or healthcare association, everything now depends on the information system: patient records, admissions, pharmacy, imaging, payroll, team coordination...
When ransomware encrypts servers or a simple workstation is used as an entry point for an attacker, continuity of care is at stake.
That's why workstations (PCs, clinical workstations, laptops) and “the ”machines" that run them (servers, network, storage) has become a strategic issue, not just an IT one.
1. Why substations and infrastructures are at the heart of risk
Almost all recent attacks in the healthcare sector follow the same pattern:
A user station is compromised (mail bomb, website bomb, USB key).
The attacker recovers identifiers, is on the rise, reaching the’directory and servers.
It encrypts or steals data, shuts down critical applications and blocks hospitals.
In other words:
- the workstation is the front door,
- l’infrastructure is the final target.
Strengthening these two levels means reducing the risk of mass blockages in a very tangible way.
2. The right reflexes for safe workstations
Here, the idea is to build a a simple, homogeneous and controllable base for workstations.
Homogenous, controlled workstations
We define a few job profiles (nursing, administration, management...) who start from common images, with the same basic settings.
We take this opportunity to remove unnecessary software which increase the attack surface and complicate management.
The more similar the positions, the easier it is to manage, correct and monitor them.
Limited rights to limit damage
Users stay on standard accounts, without administrative rights on their workstations.
The technical teams use separate admin accounts, only when necessary.
Thus, if a user account is stolen, the attacker cannot take complete control of the station in just a few clicks.
Protect and detect on every workstation
Each station has a centrally managed antimalware.
When possible, we add a more advanced brick (EDR/XDR type) that monitors machine behavior and sends alerts in the event of suspicious activity (massive encryption, unusual execution, etc.).
In practice, it's a “alarm system” for each station.
Keeping workstations up to date
We set up a regular updating process for the system and the main software :
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rapid tests on a small perimeter,
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then rolled out to the rest of the fleet.
It's hardly visible to users, but it's one of the most important the most effective levers to close doors already known to attackers.
Protecting mobiles and data
All laptops should have their own encrypted disk.
In the event of loss or theft, this prevents a third party from directly retrieving patient data from the disk.
Training and coaching users
Finally, the technical base is not enough without the right reflexes on the human side.
A short, job-specific awareness-raising sessions (nurses, secretaries, managers, etc.) and simulated mail bombs to anchor the right reactions: don't click, alert, pass on to support.
Together, they form a workstation base both realistic for the field... and solid in the face of the most common attacks.
3. The right reflexes for securing infrastructure (servers, network, etc.)
On the machine side, the aim is twofold: making compromise more difficult and limit propagation if something goes wrong.
Active Directory expertise
- Separate administration accounts from “day-to-day” accounts.
- Limit the number of people with very high entitlements.
- Monitor sensitive operations (adding to admin groups, modifying policies, etc.).
When the directory is compromised, everything else is within the attacker's reach: it deserves special attention.
Segmented network
- Separate networks: users, servers, biomedical equipment, guests, etc.
- Instead of connecting everything to everything, authorize only the flows you need.
The idea: if a workstation is infected, it should not be able to reach all critical servers in a matter of seconds.
Hardened and monitored servers
- Apply consistent security settings on all servers (unnecessary services turned off, logs enabled, access filtered).
- Keep systems and technical components up to date.
- Centralize newspapers (logs) to identify abnormal activity.
Reliable, isolated backups
- Backups tested regularly (to check that you really know how to restore).
- A portion of the backups are stored isolated from the network, so that ransomware doesn't encrypt them too.
- Clear prioritization: which systems to restore first to restart clinical activity.
Supervision and reaction
- Gather logs from workstations, servers, firewalls, etc. in one place.
- Use a supervision center (internal or external) to analyze alerts.
- Documenting response procedures These include isolating a substation, cutting off a network segment, switching to downgraded mode and informing the authorities.
4. How Phishia helps hospitals and associations in concrete terms
Phishia acts as partner in the field to transform these principles into operational reality:
- Targeted diagnosis mapping of critical workstations, servers and workflows, and analysis of the most significant weaknesses.
- Defining a realistic base : workstation profiles, rights adjustment, update policy, simple but effective network segmentation.
- Implementation support Support for in-house teams and service providers to deploy measures without disrupting care.
- Awareness-raising and exercises These include e-mail attack simulation campaigns, crisis management exercises, and updates to BCP/ERP plans to integrate these protections.
The aim is not to sell you yet another layer of technology, but to build coherent, usable protection with your means.
5. What about your jobs and your infra?
Do you manage a hospital, group or healthcare association and feel that your workstations or infrastructure are vulnerable?
Let's discuss it: in just a few discussions, we can identify your priorities and build a customized action plan.
